UIC Law Review
Volume 40

Issue 4

Article 11

Summer 2007

Theseus, the Labyrinth, and the Ball of String: Navigating the
Regulatory Maze to Ensure Enforceability of Tribal Gaming
Contracts, 40 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1123 (2007)
Heidi McNeil Staudenmaier
Ruth K. Khalsa

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Contracts Commons, Gaming Law Commons,
Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
Heidi McNeil Staudenmaier & Ruth K. Khalsa, Theseus, the Labyrinth, and the Ball of String: Navigating the
Regulatory Maze to Ensure Enforceability of Tribal Gaming Contracts, 40 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1123 (2007)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol40/iss4/11
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

THESEUS, THE LABYRINTH, AND THE
BALL OF STRING: NAVIGATING THE
REGULATORY MAZE TO ENSURE
ENFORCEABILITY OF TRIBAL
GAMING CONTRACTS
HEIDI MCNEIL STAUDENMAIER*

I.

& RUTH K.

KHALSA**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA") was passed
nearly twenty years ago, countless non-Indian contractors and
businesses have entered into casino management or consulting
agreements with tribes and tribal entities. Under the IGRA, all
casino management contracts require approval by the National
Indian Gaming Commission ("NIGC") to be valid and enforceable,
while "consulting agreements" do not.
As recent litigation
involving a prominent gaming-law firm emphasized, mistakes in
distinguishing between these two types of agreements can have
devastating consequences.
Unfortunately for the tribes and their business partners, the
NIGC approval process can be time-consuming and costly.
Because time is often of the essence in gaming-related
transactions, clients may balk at the prospect of shelving a
development deal worth several million dollars while they await
NIGC review of a minor document such as a trademark licensing
agreement.
Accordingly, clients may charge counsel with
sidestepping this process and preparing agreements for which
NIGC approval is unnecessary.
In the five years since Catskill Development, LLC v. Park
Place Entertainment Corp.' and United States v. Casino Magic

* Heidi McNeil Staudenmaier is a partner with the Phoenix, Arizona law
firm of Snell & Wilmer.
Ms. Staudenmaier has extensive experience
practicing all aspects of Indian and gaming law, and has been involved in
numerous transactions involving management contracts and consulting
agreements. She can be reached at (602) 382-6366 or at hstaudenmaier
@swlaw.com.
.* Ruth K. Khalsa is an associate with the Phoenix, Arizona law firm of
Snell & Wilmer, where her practice emphasizes Indian and gaming law. She
can be reached at (602) 382-6218 or at rkhalsa@swlaw.com.
1. Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park Place Entm't Corp. (Catskill 1), 144 F.
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Corp.' discussed the distinction between agreements requiring
NIGC approval and those that do not, several other courts have
weighed in on the issue. This article surveys the most pertinent
cases construing the NIGC approval requirements since Catskills
and Casino Magic, in an effort to provide practical guidelines to
practitioners attempting to identify which transaction documents
should be submitted to the NIGC for approval.
II.

NECESSARY DELAY: THE

NIGC APPROVAL

PROCESS

Gaming law practitioners review and prepare countless
agreements, contracts, and subcontracts relating to various
aspects of casino development, construction, and operation. Under
the IGRA, all casino management contracts relating to a tribal
gaming operation must be submitted to the NIGC for approval or
the issuance of a declination letter.3 Federal regulations identify
two categories of such contracts: (1) "management" agreements 4
and (2) all agreements and other documents "collateral" to the
management contracts.5 A document is considered "collateral" to a
management contract if it is "related, directly or indirectly, to a
management contract, or to any rights, duties or obligations
created between a tribe . . . and a management contractor."6

Supp. 2d 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park Place Entm't Corp.
(Catskill I/), 154 F. Supp. 2d 696 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park
Place Entm't Corp. (CatskillIII), 217 F. Supp. 2d 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
2. United States v. Casino Magic Corp., 293 F.3d 419 (8th Cir. 2002).
3. 25 C.F.R. § 533.1 (2007). Unlike management contracts, consulting
agreements do not require full NIGC approval to be enforceable. Infra note 10
and accompanying text. Nonetheless, a consulting agreement should still be
submitted to the NIGC for the issuance of a declination letter confirming its
enforceability as a non-management contract. While full NIGC approval can
take a year or longer, a declination letter can often be obtained within a few
months.
Practitioners should be aware, however, that securing a declination
letter does not guarantee future enforceability of the subject transaction
Even after the NIGC has issued a
documents under all circumstances.
declination letter finding that full approval is unnecessary with regard to
particular documents, additional agreements negotiated subsequent to the
declination letter's issuance can alter this status. Accordingly, if a client, after
obtaining a declination letter for a particular agreement, later enters
additional agreements that relate to the same transaction, counsel should
advise the client to either seek a second NIGC declination letter for these
additional documents, or to confirm with the NIGC that they are covered by
the original declination letter. For an in-depth discussion of the NIGC
approval process, see Heidi McNeil Staudenmaier, Negotiating Enforceable
Tribal Gaming Management Agreements, 7 GAMING L. REV. 31 (2003).
4. 25 C.F.R. § 502.15 (2007).
5. 25 C.F.R. § 502.5 (2007).
6. Id.

20071

Theseus, the Labyrinth, and the Ball of String

1125

Absent NIGC approval, both management contracts and their
collateral agreements are void ab initio, and thus unenforceable. 7
The NIGC approval process has three components: (1) legal
and financial review of the management contract and its collateral
documents; (2) scrutiny of the proposed project's compliance with
the National Environmental Policy Act; and (3) investigation of
the suitability of all companies, entities, and individuals with
direct or indirect financial interests.8 While these components
may proceed simultaneously, all must be completed before the
NIGC Chairman can approve an agreement.9 The NIGC will not
begin the approval process until it has received the management
contract and all collateral documents. The actual approval process
can take a year or more to complete.
Frequently in gaming-related transactions, time is of the
essence. Developers and other contractors are eager to maximize
profits and are understandably reluctant to shelve a multimillion
dollar development project for a year or more, pending NIGC
review of the transaction documents. In an effort to sidestep this
delay, many entities choose to enter consulting agreements with
tribes, tribal contractors, or subcontractors. Unlike a management

7. 25 C.F.R. § 533.7 (2007).
8. 25 U.S.C. § 2711(e)(1)(D) (2000); 25 C.F.R. § 533.6(c) (2007).
Background investigations are generally performed by the tribe or the State
(depending on the applicable tribal-state gaming compact), but the NIGC itself
must issue the suitability finding. Moreover, regardless of the result of an
investigation, the NIGC retains the discretion to nevertheless refuse approval
for a management contract based on .other information that intimates that a
financially-interested entity is "unsuitable." 25 U.S.C. § 2711(e)(1)(D); 25
C.F.R. § 533.6(c).
9. 25. U.S.C. § 2711(a)(1) (2000). Pursuant to the IGRA and applicable
NIGC regulations, a management contract must contain certain terms. See 25
U.S.C. § 2711(b) (2000) (requiring the contract provide adequate accounting
procedures, tribal access to daily operation records, a minimum guaranteed
payment to the tribe, a ceiling for the repayment of construction costs, a
contract term no more than five years, and grounds for termination of the
contract); see also 25 C.F.R. §§ 531, 533 (2007) (mandating, in addition to the
requirements enumerated in 25 U.S.C. § 2711(b), that management contracts
shall contain provisions detailing compensation arrangements, establishing
the extent to which the contract may be assigned or subcontracted, notifying
the parties of approval required by the tribe for changes in ownership
interests). For a brief overview of these required terms, see Staudenmaier,
supra note 3, at 32. The NIGC also offers a practical checklist and suggests
that each item be completed before a management contract or collateral
agreement is submitted for NIGC approval. Practitioners can obtain copies of
this checklist, along with a list of applicable NIGC regulations and other
useful information from the NIGC website at http://www.nigc.gov or via the
NIGC Fax On Demand System at (202) 632-1006. The checklist is also
available in hard copy, upon written request to the NIGC at 1441 L Street
NW, 9th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005. Questions regarding the review
process should be directed to NIGC staff at (202) 632-7003.
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or collateral agreement, a consulting agreement may not require
NIGC approval to be enforceable. °
The challenge for gaming law practitioners lies in
determining whether a particular gaming-related contract or
document is a consulting agreement or an agreement collateral to
a management contract. The incorrect categorization carries
severe consequences." When the enforceability of an agreement is
tested, that agreement may be deemed void ab initio," and thus
unenforceable as an unapproved "agreement collateral to a
management contract.""
Despite the importance of correctly identifying which gamingrelated contracts require approval, the NIGC regulations provide
scant guidance to distinguish a consulting agreement from a
management or collateral agreement.
Nonetheless, certain
characteristics appear to be significant to this distinction,
including the method for calculating the contractor's compensation
(flat fee or percentage of gaming revenue); the length of the
agreement's term; and whether the consultant will also perform
activities that the NIGC considers to be management-related. 4
The murky distinction between these two types of agreements has
spawned a substantial body of case law, beginning with Catskills
and Casino Magic."
As those cases remind practitioners,
obtaining an NIGC declination letter for a questionable contract is
the most reliable way to avoid liability and ensure an agreement's
enforceability.
III. SEVERE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO SEEK NIGC APPROVAL

While obtaining a declination letter for a questionable
contract is the most prudent way of dispelling doubts as to the
enforceability of any gaming-related contract, the declination
process can take several months or longer. Clients involved in a

10. National Indian Gaming Commission,

Bulletin 94-5, Approved

Management Contracts vs. Consulting Agreements (Oct. 14, 1994), available at

http://www.nigc.gov/ReadingRoom/Bulletins/BulletinNo 19945/tabid/181/Defau
lt.aspx [hereinafter NIGC Bulletin 94-5]. The NIGC considers a contract to be
a consulting agreement, which does not require approval, when the agreement
provides for completing a finite task with a defined completion date, for a fixed
fee, daily, or hourly rate. Id.
11. See id. ("[Clonsequences are severe for a manager who mistakes his
management agreement for a consulting agreement.").

12. 25 C.F.R. § 533.7.
13. 25 C.F.R. § 502.5.
14. NIGC Bulletin 94-5, supra note 10.
15. Catskill 1, 144 F. Supp. 2d 215; Catskill H, 154 F. Supp. 2d 696; Catskill

III, 217 F. Supp. 2d 423; Casino Magic, 293 F.3d 419; see also Staudenmaier,
supra note 5, at 33-36 (discussing the holdings of the Catskill trilogy and
Casino Magic cases with regard to the distinction between management and
consulting agreements).
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minor aspect of a gaming facility's development, construction, or
operation may bristle at the inconvenience this delay causes. The
practitioner, however, must persuade the client not to overlook
this important step. Recent litigation involving a prominent
national law firm highlights the importance of encouraging clients
to exercise the patience required to obtain a declination letter for
any document pertaining to any aspect of the financing required
for the 16development, construction, or operation of the gaming
facility.
The aforementioned litigation arose from a twenty-eight
million dollar casino financing project that involved a well-known
Minnesota investment bank. 17 The bank hired the law firm to
document the loans to fund the construction of a new casino owned
by the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe ("St. Regis")."6 Before the loans
closed, the attorneys discussed whether one particular document,
the Notice and Acknowledgement of Pledge ("Pledge Agreement"),
required NIGC approval. 9 The law firm did not mention its
concern to its banking client, nor did the firm advise its client to
seek NIGC approval or declination of the Pledge Agreement.2" The
transaction closed and the loans were funded, but the client was
not made aware that its Pledge Agreement with the borrower
might be unenforceable.'
Thereafter, the borrower defaulted.22 The bank once again
retained the law firm, this time to collect the amount due per the
loan.23 During the course of this representation, St. Regis, who
owned the casino, claimed that the unapproved Pledge Agreement
Because the NIGC never approved or
was unenforceable.
declined the Pledge Agreement, St. Regis disclaimed liability for
repaying the loans.25 The law firm did not mention its earlier
concerns regarding this exact issue, and maintained that it had
always believed that the Pledge Agreement did not require
approval." The ensuing litigation yielded a multi-million dollar
16. In re SRC Holding Corp., Nos. 02-40284 to 02-40286, 2007 WL 1080002,
at *1 (Bankr. D. Minn. Apr. 6, 2007).

17. Id. at *5.
18. Id. at *1.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at *2.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. Plaintiffs, in response to the law firm's contention that it never
believed that the Pledge Agreement required NIGC approval, pointed to an
internal memo labeled "Privileged Document Subject to Attorney-Client
Privilege." Id. at *10-11. The memo, which was addressed to the firm's client
as well as other banks involved in the transaction's financing, discussed the
firm's concerns as to the enforceability of the unapproved Pledge Agreement.
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legal malpractice verdict against the law firm.27
IV.

DETERMINING WHEN

NIGC

APPROVAL MAY BE NECESSARY

In the five years since Catskills and Casino Magic discussed
the differences between management and consulting agreements,
several circuits have shed light on the characteristics
distinguishing the two agreements. The body of case law that has
developed since Catskills and Casino Magic provides additional
guidance and direction to practitioners of tribal gaming law with
respect to which collateral agreements and documents should be
submitted to the NIGC for review and approval or declination.
This section begins with a discussion of the most important of
the cases, the Tenth Circuit's decision in FirstAmerican Kickapoo
Operations, L.L.C. v. Multimedia Garners, Inc. ("Kickapoo").
Kickapoo offers useful advice for practitioners seeking to draft
enforceable contracts. Kickapoo identifies specific contract terms,
which if present, require NIGC approval. An analysis of other
recent cases in which the documents at issue were deemed
collateral and required NIGC approval follows the discussion of
Kickapoo. The section concludes with an overview of two cases in
which collateral documents required no approval.
A. Kickapoo: Follow the Money
In Kickapoo, the Tenth Circuit determined that an Operating
Lease Agreement (the "Lease") between a non-tribal contractor
and an Indian tribe was "unambiguously" a management
contract." The non-tribal contractor argued in favor of severing
any management-related provisions and declaring the lease a
mere construction loan and lease agreement. The court, however,
pointed to several key terms that indicated that the overall
function of the Lease, and the parties' original intent in entering
it, was to transfer responsibility for managerial activities from the
Tribe to the non-tribal contractor.'
Accordingly, because the
Lease did not receive NIGC approval, it was void ab initio, and
thus unenforceable against the Tribe as the breaching party. 2

Id. at *10. For further details on the casino financing debacle, see In re SRC
Holding Corp., 2007 WL 1080002, at *1.
27. Leigh Jones, Dorsey & Whitney on the Hook for Botched Indian Casino
Deal, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 10, 2007, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/Pub
ArticleNL,.jsp?id=117612245767.
28. First American Kickapoo Operations, L.L.C. v. Multimedia Garners,
Inc., 412 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 2005).
29. Id. at 1175.
30. Id. at 1169.
31. Id. at 1172-73.
32. Id. at 1176.
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In reaching its holding, the Kickapoo Court considered the
provisions of the Lease in light of the applicable statutory and
regulatory authority, as well as the pertinent NIGC materials.33
Principles gleaned from all three sources allowed the Tenth
Circuit to identify specific contract terms that indicated that the
agreement functioned and was intended to function as a
management contract, thus requiring NIGC approval.34
1.

Proceduraland FactualBackground

In Kickapoo, the Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma ("Tribe") and
First American entered into an operating lease.35 Pursuant to the
lease, First American was to construct and operate a Class II
gaming facility on tribal land, and lease all gaming equipment
required by the operation.36 The Tribe would repay the
construction costs, but First American had to guarantee a $20,000
monthly payment to the Tribe.
That monthly payment had
precedence over the Tribe's repayment of the construction loan.38
Under the lease, First American would also receive forty percent of
the net revenue from the gaming operation in exchange for leasing
all of the required equipment. 9
Weeks after the casino opened for business in 2001, the NIGC
informed the Tribe that its gaming ordinances violated applicable
IGRA requirements.4" The Tribe promptly closed the casino and
amended its gaming ordinances to comply with IGRA.41 It also
submitted the Operating Lease to the NIGC for a determination as
to whether the Lease would be considered a management contract
requiring NICG approval.42 When the NIGC responded in the
affirmative, the Tribe, counting on the Lease's unenforceability,
broke off business dealings with First American and began leasing
equipment from defendant Multimedia instead.' Soon thereafter,
First American sued Multimedia for tortious interference with
contractual relations and requested injunctive relief."
After the district court refused to grant a preliminary
injunction against Multimedia, Multimedia moved for summary
judgment on the theory that the Lease was void ab initio as an

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 1172-75.
Id. at 1175.
Id. at 1168.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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unapproved management contract.5 As a void contract, it could
not form the basis for any claim sounding in contract.' The court
denied this motion but wavered as to whether the language of the
Lease actually indicated it was a management contract.47
Several months later, however, the district court changed its
position. When the parties agreed that "the determination as to
whether the agreement is a management contract is a question of
law for the court,"8 the court agreed to consider extrinsic evidence,
in order to better understand the factual context and
circumstances under which the Lease was negotiated and
executed 9 Ultimately, the court determined that the Operating
Lease was unambiguously a management contract and, therefore,
void because it was not approved by the NIGC. 0
2.

Significant Characteristicsof the Kickapoo Agreement

In reaching its holding that the Operating Lease was a
management contract, the Kickapoo court consulted both federal
and NIGC materials. Federal regulations promulgated under
IGRA define management activity in terms of "set[ting] up
working policy for the gaming operation."5' Based on this, the
Tenth Circuit found it significant that the Operating Lease gave
First American full responsibility for establishing employee
management procedures."
The court further emphasized the
autonomy the Lease granted to First American in developing and
establishing "working policy" with respect to all other aspects of

45. Id. at 1168. First American also moved for summary judgment,
contending that any management-related provisions in the Lease were
severable. Id. at 1169. It argued that, without the offending provisions, the
Lease was only a construction loan and equipment lease. Id. The court denied
this motion because unresolved issues of fact remained outstanding. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. The district court declared the Lease to be "ambiguous with respect
to whether... [it] provides for management of the gaming operation by First
American." Id. (internal quotation omitted) (internal citations omitted).
48. See id. at 1170-71 ("[T]he parties and the court were in apparent
agreement that the construction of the contract was a matter of law, an
agreement inconsistent with a continuing belief that the Operating Lease is
ambiguous.").
49. Id. at 1171.

50. Id. at 1172. The district court determined that the Operating Lease
was "much more than a vendor's agreement to provide gaming equipment."
Id. The court's revised determination that the Operating Lease was void as an
unapproved management contract effectively eviscerated First American's
claim of tortious interference with contract, leaving it with a single claim, for
tortious interference with business relations, on which it was also unable to
prevail. Id. at 1169.
51. 25 C.F.R. § 502.19 (2007).
52. Kickapoo, 412 F.3d at 1172-73.
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"the maintenance, operation and management" of the gaming
operation. 3
For additional guidance as to whether the Lease was truly a
management contract, the Kickapoo court turned to the NIGC
materials. 54 The NIGC, in an effort to provide more practical
guidance as to what differentiates contracts requiring approval
from those that do not, has identified seven activities of a gaming
operation that constitute management activities. 5 A contract need
not include terms relating to all seven activities to require NIGC
approval: "The presence of some or all of these activities in a
contract with a tribe strongly suggests that the contract ... is a
management contract requiring Commission approval." 6
The Kickapoo Operating Lease contained terms providing for
five of the seven management activities enumerated by the
NIGC,57 including: (1) maintaining accounting procedures and
preparing monthly financial reports; (2) paying a minimum
guaranteed amount to the Tribe; (3) financing for construction and
development provided by a non-tribal entity; (4) establishing an
ongoing relationship between the Tribe and non-tribal entity; and
(5) calculating compensation based on a percentage fee
(performance-based compensation). 8 The other two managementsuggestive terms identified by the NIGC, but not present in the
Kickapoo Lease, relate to providing "access to the gaming
operation by appropriate tribal officials" and terms providing "for
assignment or subcontracting of responsibilities." 9
Besides containing five of the seven NIGC management
terms, the Kickapoo Lease conformed closely to the three statutory
and regulatory requirements specific to management contracts.
First, the five-year term, and the percentage of monthly net
gaming revenue the contractor was to receive (forty percent), were
the maximum allowed by statute. ° Second, the Lease required the
minimum payment guaranteed to the Tribe by the non-tribal
contractor ($20,000 per month under the Kickapoo Lease) to take
53. Id. at 1172.

54. Id. at 1174. The Tenth Circuit recognized, in so doing, that "informal
pronouncements of an agency" are not entitled to the same deference as
statutory or regulatory materials, but reasoned nonetheless that "the NIGC's
apparent position [as expressed in an NIGC advisory bulletin and its informal
Opinion Letter to the Tribe] coincides with our holding in this case [that the
Lease is a management contract requiring approval]." Id.
55. NIGC Bulletin 94-5, supra note 10.
56. Kickapoo, 412 F.3d at 1174 (quoting NIGC Bulletin 94-5).
57. Id. at 1174.
58. Id.; see also NIGC Bulletin 94-5, supra note 10 (listing the required
provisions in a management contract).
59. NIGC Bulletin 94-5, supra note 10.
60. Kickapoo, 412 F.3d at 1173-74 n.3; 25 U.S.C. § 2711(c)(1) (2000); 25
C.F.R. § 531.1(i)(1) (2007); 25 U.S.C. § 2711(b)(5) (2000); 25 C.F.R. § 531.1(h)
(2007).
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precedence over the Tribe's repayment of construction costs
advanced by the contractor.6 1 Third, the Lease limited both the
amount First American could spend on development and
improvement as well as the amount of these costs it could recover
from the Tribe.
3. Pointers for Practitioners:Terms Transferring
Responsibility and Parties'OriginalIncentive
One of Kickapoo's most important contributions to
practitioners of Indian gaming law lies in identifying specific
contract terms that indicate the need for NIGC approval or, at
least, declination.
As the NIGC suggests, this list is nonexhaustive.' Moreover, the presence of any one term may suffice
to render an unapproved contract void.' Accordingly, gaming law
practitioners should scrutinize any contract or agreement that is
connected to a casino development project, no matter how
insignificant, and follow the money by tracing how and why the
payments are made between the parties to the contract.
Any contract term that transfers responsibility from a tribe to
a non-tribal entity is sufficient grounds for advising a client to
seek NIGC approval of the entire agreement. Suspect contract
terms include: any that transfer responsibility for performing daily
operations and/or maintenance of a gaming operation; any that
transfer
responsibility for establishing
and maintaining
accounting procedures for a gaming operation; any that transfer
responsibility for financing procedures, for example, financial
reporting, paying taxes, compensating employees, or paying other
costs; any that set term limits for transferring certain powers or
conferring certain rights; any that quantify the payments or
compensation to which parties are entitled; any that delineate the
sources from which payments are to be made (particularly when
these specify that payments are to be based on revenues from
gaming operations); and any that transfer responsibility,
authority, and/or control over the construction of a gaming
operation (beyond contracts for mere construction of the physical
facilities).
Kickapoo further suggests two principles that practitioners
may apply to any contract relating to tribal gaming operations in
order to determine whether the contract should be submitted to
the NIGC for approval or declination. First, what is the overall
61. Kickapoo, 412 F.3d at 1173; 25 U.S.C. § 2711 (b)(3) (2000); 25 C.F.R.
§ 531.1(f) (2007).
62. Kickapoo, 412 F.3d at 1174; 25 U.S.C. § 2711 (b)(4) (2000); 25 C.F.R.
§ 531.1(g) (2007).
63. NIGC Bulletin 94-5, supra note 10.
64. 25 U.S.C. § 2711 (2000); see also 25 C.F.R. § 531.1 (2007) (listing
required provisions for gaming-related management agreements).
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effect of the agreement? Regardless of whether the agreement
contains a formal provision relating to management obligations,
does it effectively transfer responsibility for any managementrelated functions from the tribe to a non-tribal entity? The second
principle looks to the parties' original incentive for entering the
agreement: Does this original incentive relate to the non-tribal
party's performance of some arguably management-related
function?
With regard to the contract's overall effect, Kickapoo made
clear that a contract may require NIGC approval even if no term
formally obligates the non-tribal contractor to perform
management functions per se.' The Tenth Circuit noted that the
definition of a management contract contained in the federal
regulations is "partial rather than absolute, contingent rather
than comprehensive."' Accordingly, even though First American's
primary obligations under the Lease related to construction
activities and the provision of gaming equipment, per the Code of
Federal Regulations' ("C.F.R.") definition of "management
contract," the features of the agreement that resembled "minimum
requirements of a management contract" overshadowed the
obligations."
The overall effect was to give the contractor
"considerable and continuing influence over the day-to-day
running of the Tribe's gaming operation."
More importantly, regarding the original incentive behind the
parties' decision to enter the agreement, Kickapoo posits that an
arguably void, unapproved management contract cannot be saved
by a court's blue-penciling if the parties' original intent pertains to
shifting responsibility for some management-related function from
the tribe to the non-tribal entity. The Kickapoo court determined
that the Tribe's original intent for entering into the Operating
Lease was to delegate certain day-to-day management functions to
First American, in exchange for a guaranteed monthly payment.69
First American "held itself out to the Tribe as experienced" in
developing and managing business enterprises, and guaranteed
the Tribe the monthly $20,000 payment that had precedence over
the Tribe's construction loan repayment."0
The guaranteed
payment was a "material and substantial term" of the Lease."
More significantly, guaranteed payments such as the above are
65. Kickapoo, 412 F.3d at 1175.
66. Id. at 1175 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 502.15).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1178. The Lease delegated to First American the responsibility
for developing employment policy, supervising employees for the first three
months of the casino's operation, outlining an operating plan for the casino,
and establishing both the start-up budget and the operating budget. Id.

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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required features of management contracts under federal law.7 2
Accordingly, the original parties' intent prevented the court from
exercising the contract's severability clause to strike the
management-related provisions.73
The Lease, including the
management provisions, was a "package deal" and the provision
whereby First American guaranteed payment to the Tribe in
exchange for being allowed to assume certain responsibilities was
"almost certainly part of the package for which the Tribe
bargained.", 4 Without the guaranteed payment, the Tribe likely
would not have allowed First American to assume the
management-related functions.75
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit's analysis sheds considerable
light on exactly which contracts likely require NIGC approval as
management contracts. Practitioners considering whether to
advise a client to seek NIGC approval or declination should
disregard, as did the Kickapoo court, the issue of whether a
contract contains a formal provision relating to management
obligations. Instead, practitioners should evaluate the practical
function and overall effect of the agreement as well as the parties'
original incentive for entering into it. Kickapoo suggests that the
most fruitful approach to this evaluation is to follow the money,
considering the manner in which parties are to receive payments
under the contract. Guaranteed minimum payments to a tribe
that take precedence over the tribe's repayment of the costs
advanced by the non-tribal contractor, or fees calculated as a
percentage of gaming revenue, strongly suggest that the
agreement in question is a management contract.
B. Agreements Collateralto a ManagementAgreement
Often in gaming-facility development projects, practitioners
are asked to draft agreements that will allow the preliminary
stages of the project to proceed while the client awaits NIGC
approval of the management contracts and related transaction
documents.
Practitioners,
reasoning that
these interim
agreements are not intended to be management contracts or
transfer management responsibility, may believe them to be
enforceable without NIGC approval or declination. As the cases in
this section illustrate, however, that belief is often misguided.
When the enforceability of such an interim agreement is
challenged, a court ultimately may determine that the agreement
is unenforceable for lack of NIGC approval. Notwithstanding the
contract's language, disclaimer provisions, or other formalities, a

72. Id. (internal citations omitted).
73. Id.

74. Id.
75. Id.
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court may find several reasons for labeling the contract a
management or collateral-to-management agreement. In MatchE-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. KeanArgovitz Resorts, L.L.C. ("Kean-Argovitz"),8 the court held that the
Development Agreement, which was drafted to allow a casino
development project to proceed during the NIGC approval process
of the primary transaction documents, was unenforceable.77 The
court determined that the agreement, which had not been
submitted for NIGC approval, was collateral to a management
contract per the IGRA. The court ignored two express disclaimer
provisions in the contract. Instead, the court pointed to the overall
structure of the transaction and the agreement's function within
that structure, which linked it to the actual Management
Contract. 9 Likewise, in Machal, Inc. v. Jena Banc of Choctaw
Indians and Jena Band of Choctaw Indians v. Tri-Millennium
Corp., Inc. ("Jena Band cases")," the court looked beyond the
parties' benign intent in entering the Development and Settlement
agreements and the promises of future performance contained in
those agreements. The court fixated on the practical consequences
of a particular provision that effectuated an immediate transfer of
managerial authority.
As the discussion below reveals,
practitioners seeking to draft enforceable interim agreements can
learn much from the approach and reasoning employed by the two
district courts in these cases. Ultimately, both courts found the
agreements at issue to be collateral to a management contract,
and thus void for lack of NIGC approval.
1. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Potawatomi Indians v.
Kean-Argovitz Resorts, L.L.C.
The district court in Kean-Argovitz evaluated
the
enforceability of two agreements between a newly recognized
Tribe81 and a non-tribal casino management and development
company. 82
Neither the Management Agreement nor the
Development Agreement for the project had been submitted to the

76. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. KeanArgovitz Resorts, L.L.C., 249 F. Supp. 2d 901 (W.D. Mich. 2003), overruled on
other grounds, 383 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 2004).
77. Kean-Argovitz, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 902.
78. Id. at 907.
79. Id.
80. Machal, Inc. v. Jena Band of Choctaw Indians, 387 F. Supp. 2d 659
(W.D. La. 2005); Jena Band of Choctaw Indians v. Tri-Millennium Corp., 387
F. Supp. 2d 671 (W.D. La. 2005).
81. Apparently, the Tribe did not become a federally-recognized tribe until
August of 1999, almost a year after it entered the two agreements with the
developer. Kean-Argovitz, 383 F.3d at 514.
82. Kean-Argovitz, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 902.
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NIGC for approval.8 The court ultimately determined that both
were void ab initio for lack of NIGC approval.' The Development
Agreement was collateral to the Management Agreement and
could not escape the NIGC approval requirement, despite two
express disclaimer provisions stating it was not intended as a
management contract.85 In support of this finding, the court
pointed to three provisions of the Development Agreement that
related to the "management of future gaming operations," thereby
closely linking the Development Agreement with the Management
Contract.' Even though the decision was reversed on appeal, 7 the
court's reasoning is instructive for practitioners seeking to guide
clients through the regulatory hurdles involved in ensuring that
agreements relating to development and management of tribal
gaming facilities will be enforceable.
a.

Procedural and Factual Background

In 1998, the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Potawatomi
Indians (the "Tribe") and a non-tribal casino developer negotiated
and entered into two agreements providing for development and
management of a proposed casino.'
Shortly thereafter, before
either agreement could be approved by the NIGC, the Tribe broke
off its business relationship with the developer. 9 Relying on the
unapproved status of the agreements to ensure their
unenforceability, the Tribe filed for declaratory and injunctive
relief to prevent enforcement of either agreement. 90
The district court wasted little time in determining that the
Management Agreement was void for lack of NIGC approval.9'
Neither party disputed that the Management Agreement fell
within the official definition of a management agreement,92 and
federal statutory and regulatory authority unequivocally require
NIGC approval of all management contracts pertaining to Indian
gaming facilities. 93
Because the Tribe had terminated its
relationship with the developer and filed suit before the NIGC

83. Id. at 904.
84. Id. at 904-05.
85. Id. at 907.
86. Id. at 905-06.
87. Kean-Argovitz, 383 F.3d at 514.
88. Kean-Argovitz, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 902-03.
89. Id. at 902.
90. Id. at 903.
91. Id. at 904.
92. Id. (internal citation omitted).
93. Id. (internal quotation omitted). "Management contracts and changes
in persons with a financial interest in or management responsibility for a
management contract, that have not been approved by the Secretary of the
Interior or the Chairman... are void." 25 C.F.R. § 533.7 (2007).
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b.

The Development Agreement
The determination of whether the Development Agreement
also required NIGC approval to be enforceable demanded more
extensive analysis, especially of the agreement's substance and the
transaction's structure. On the one hand, if the Development
Agreement was collateral to the management contract, it would be
void absent NIGC approval.9" On the other hand, if it was not
collateral, the Development Agreement might be enforceable even
without NIGC approval. As the defendant developer who sought
to enforce the Agreement reminded the court, "not every contract
that is merely peripherally associated with tribal gaming is
subject to IGRA's constraints."'
In support of its argument for enforceability, the developer
pointed to two express disclaimer provisions in the Development
Agreement. The first stated unambiguously that that the parties
did not intend the Development Agreement to be a management
contract, and that it was not to be construed as such.97 The second
disclaimer stated that the parties' objective in entering into the
Development Agreement was to establish a legally enforceable
means to move ahead with the land acquisition and development
aspects of the project "prior to the approval of the Management
Agreement by the NIGC.""
Further, the second disclaimer
specified that the Development Agreement was "intended to be...
independent of the Management Agreement" and to be enforceable
"regardless of whether the [Development] Agreement or the
Management Agreement [was] approved by the Chairperson of the
NIGC." 99
Unfortunately for the non-tribal developer, neither disclaimer
provision had the intended effect of rendering the unapproved
Development Agreement enforceable." ° The court pointed to other

94. Kean-Argovitz, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 903-05.
95. Id. at 904 (internal citation omitted). Federal regulations define a
collateral agreement requiring NIGC approval as "any contract ... related,
either directly or indirectly, to a management contract, or to any rights, duties
or obligations created between a tribe ... and a management contractor or

subcontractor." 25 C.F.R. § 502.5.
96. Kean-Argovitz, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 905 (quoting Casino Res. Corp. v.
Harrah's Entm't, Inc., 243 F.3d 435, 439 (8th Cir. 2001) (internal citations
omitted).

97. Id. at 905.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 907. "Despite the parties' best efforts to insert language into the
Development Agreement labeling it separate and distinct from the
Management Agreement, the terms of the Development Agreement evidence

1138

The John Marshall Law Review

[40:1123

terms as "ample evidence" of the Development Agreement's
"linkage to the Management Agreement, thus rendering it
collateral to the Management Agreement."'0 ' In focusing on the
interrelation between the two agreements within the development
project's overall structure, the district court adopted the "combined
effect" approach taken by the Eighth Circuit in United States v.
Casino Magic Corp.102 By taking this broad view, the court
identified three specific management-related provisions in the
Development Agreement.0
First, the Development Agreement provided that the nontribal developer would arrange all of the funding for the casino
development and pre-opening costs. °4 Pursuant to this provision,
the loans were to be repaid solely from the gaming revenues-a
feature that the NIGC considers suggestive of a Management
Agreement requiring approval."' Moreover, the developer's loan
commitment was expressly identified as consideration for the
Tribe's grant of exclusive development rights."
The exclusive
rights included not only development-related rights, but also the
right to manage the casino per the Management Agreement. 7
Second, the exclusivity provision in the Development
Agreement was linked to the Management Agreement." Under
the exclusivity provision, the Tribe agreed to deal solely with the
non-tribal developer for all of the gaming-related development on
the tribal land. This requirement started on the effective date of
the Development Agreement, and would not end until the
"termination of the Management Contract.""'
Third, the developer's loan commitment was expressly
conditioned on the execution of a Management Agreement with

that it was directly related to the Management Agreement and [the non-tribal
developer]'s management of the gaming facility." Id.

101. Id. at 905.
102. See Casino Magic Corp., 293 F.3d at 425 (noting that the "combined
effect of the series of agreements" had the practical effect of giving
"managerial control" to the non-tribal casino developer).
103. Kean-Argovitz, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 907.
104. See id. at 906. The developer:
agreed to make available to [the Tribe] ... sufficient funds to finance

the acquisition of the Tribal Land and the Gaming Facility, and has
agreed to make certain other loans directly to [the Tribe] and advance
certain other fees for [the Tribe] as consideration for the exclusive right
to develop and manage the Gaming Facility pursuant to the
Management Agreement.

Id.
105. Id.; see also NIGC Bulletin 94-5, supra note 10.
106. Kean-Argovitz, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 906.

107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 906-07.
Id. at 906.
Id.
Id. at 906-07.
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the Tribe, and subsequent approval by the NIGC."1' As such, the
non-tribal contractor's promised consideration was conditioned on
the enforceability and NIGC approval of the Management
Agreement. This feature supported the court's finding that the
Development and Management Agreements were "directly related"
to each other.'
c.

Pointers for Practitioners: Substance Over Form
Accordingly, Kean-Argovitz offers practical, cautionary
guidance for practitioners that seek to draft enforceable contracts
that will allow preliminary aspects of a gaming facility's
construction or development to proceed pending NIGC approval.
The Kean-Argovitz court's reasoning accorded much greater weight
to the practical effect of the Development Agreement and its
functional relationship with the Management Agreement, than to
the parties' formal language choices."' The financial and practical
structure of the development project was revealed through a
reading of the three provisions regarding exclusivity and loan
commitment."4 The structure had the practical effect of rendering
the disclaimer language a nullity."5
In the tradition of Casino Magic, this analytical method
focuses on the structure of the transaction as a whole, particularly
the financing aspects. The overall structure carries far greater
weight in determining which agreements require NIGC approval
than the language of any particular agreement associated with the
transaction. The substantive content embodied in the terms of the
Kean-Argovitz Development Agreement only confirmed that it was
"directly related to the Management Agreement" and the nontribal contractor's "management of the gaming facility."" 6
Practitioners should be aware that drafting formalities will not
save an unapproved agreement from unenforceability if
management-related features are interwoven into the collateral
document. Any interim contracts should be scrupulously analyzed
to ensure that they contain no terms relating to a contractor's
management of future gaming activities, or terms linking loan
repayments and other compensation to revenues generated by
future gaming operations. Moreover, after inspecting a collateral
agreement to ensure it passes muster and does not require NIGC
approval, practitioners should encourage clients nonetheless to
seek an NIGC declination letter to confirm the agreement's future
enforceability.
111. Id.

112. Id. at 907.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id. at 906-07.
Id.
Id.
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2. Machal, Inc. v. Jena Band of Choctaw Indians " 7 and Jena
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Tri-Millennium Corp."'
a.

Procedural and Factual Background

Both cases involving the Jena Band arose from the same
casino development project. Each case challenged the enforceability of various agreements between the Jena Band of Choctaw
Indians (the "Band") and the non-tribal casino developers TriMillennium, BBC, and Machal.
After becoming federally recognized in 1995, the Jena Band
searched for land on which to build a casino, and negotiated with
casino developers Tri-Millennium and BBC regarding potential
collaboration on a casino development project."9 Tri-Millennium
and BBC promised, among other things, to help the Band acquire
In exchange, the Band promised the
land and build the casino.
developers certain payments and control rights over various
aspects of the development project."' The parties executed several
Development Agreements and22 Memoranda of Understanding to
memorialize their agreement.1
To ensure that these preliminary contracts would be
enforceable, the Band wisely sought NIGC declination letters for
the Development Agreements."' The NIGC determined that the
Development Agreements were indeed management contracts for
the purposes of the IGRA, and would thus be void ab initio without
full NIGC approval.1" Although the Band reported this news to
the casino developers, the parties did not further petition the
NIGC for approval.1' Instead, the Band signed a Financing and
Brokerage Agreement (the "Machal Agreement") with Machal." 6
The agreement gave Machal many of the rights and duties that
117. 387 F. Supp. 2d 659 (W.D. La. 2005).
118. 387 F. Supp. 2d 671 (W.D. La. 2005).
119. Tri-Millennium, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 672.
120. Id.
121. Id.; Machal, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 661-62.
122. Tri-Millennium, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 673.
123. Id. at 673; Machal, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 661-62. The district court did not
consider the enforceability of the Development Agreement in either Jena Band
case. Id. at 672; Machal, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 663. Only Machal requested a
declaratory judgment that these Agreements were void for lack of NIGC
approval, Machal was not a party to, nor a third-party beneficiary of, the
agreements and, therefore, lacked standing to challenge their validity.
Machal, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 664. In both Machal and Tri-Millennium, the
court considered primarily the settlement agreements that the various parties
had entered into in an effort to effectuate some resolution to their complex
dispute. Tri-Millennium, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 678-80; Machal, 387 F. Supp. 2d
at 667-71.
124. Tri-Millennium, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 673.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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the Band had already promised Tri-Millennium and BBC under
the Development Agreements.'27
A flurry of litigation followed in which the Band, TriMillennium, and Machal each played the role of plaintiff at least
once. 128 At the heart of all the parties' claims lay the question of
whether four unapproved agreements were enforceable.
The
following four unapproved agreements were at issue in these
cases: (1) a Co-Managers Agreement between the Band, BBC, and
Machal,' 29 (2) a second agreement related to the Co-Managers
Agreement,'3 ° (3) a settlement agreement executed by the Band,
Machal and BBC (the "BBC Settlement Agreement"), 3 ' and (4) the
Tri-Millennium Settlement Agreement.'3 2 Ultimately, all four
were held to be collateral to a management contract, and thus void
and unenforceable for lack of NIGC approval. 3'
b.

The Four Agreements
(i)

The Co-Managers Agreement: A Collateral
Agreement Requiring NIGC Approval

The Machal court first considered the enforceability of the CoManagers Agreement executed by the Band, BBC, and Machal. In
an effort to circumvent the NIGC approval requirement for
collateral agreements, the parties had included in the CoManagers Agreement a stipulation that it was not a "gaming
agreement."3 "
Nonetheless, the Machal court followed the
rationale of the Western District of Michigan in Kean-Argovitz,
and accorded greater weight to the substance and content of the
rights and duties outlined in the Co-Managers Agreement than to
contract formalities. 32 This approach led the court to conclude
that the Co-Managers Agreement was unenforceable as a
collateral agreement because it lacked NIGC approval.'36
Several characteristics of the Co-Managers Agreement
suggested that the Agreement's substance was managementrelated. The Co-Managers Agreement gave non-tribal entity BBC
full responsibility for the construction and operation of the Band's

127. Id. at 673; Machal, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 662.
128. Tri-Millennium, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 673.
129. Machal, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 667.
130. Id. at 667-68.
131. Tri-Millennium, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 678-80; Machal, 387 F. Supp. 2d at
668-70.
132. Tri-Millennium, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 680.
133. Id.
134. Machal, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 667.
135. Id. The court reproved the parties for their transparent effort to
subvert the NIGC approval process, admonishing that "[the requirements of
the IGRA... cannot be so easily avoided." Id.
136. Id. at 667.
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gaming facility, including all responsibility for providing or
securing financing for the construction. 13 7 Pursuant to federal
regulations, the presence of a contract term conferring such
responsibility strongly indicates that the agreement is sufficiently
management-related to be unenforceable absent NIGC approval.'38
Further, the Co-Managers Agreement obligated Machal and BBC,
both non-tribal contractors, to provide "oversight management" for
the operation of the gaming facility. 9 The Agreement specifically
allocated authority between the two entities as "co-managers." 4 °
Moreover, the duties, rights, and responsibilities delineated in the
Agreement were "the types... usually included in a management
contract." 4 ' Notwithstanding the parties' stipulation that the CoManagers Agreement was not a gaming agreement, the
Agreement's overall effect was to "give Machal and BBC authority
over the management of an anticipated gaming operation."'42 As
such, it was undeniably a management contract, and void for lack
of NIGC approval.'"
(ii) The Related Agreement: A Collateral
Agreement Requiring NIGC Approval
The Machal court next considered the enforceability of a
second agreement between the Band, BBC, and Machal. Finding
that the terms of this second agreement "related to the CoManagers Agreement,"'" the court proceeded to evaluate the
agreement's substance and effect. 4
Like the Co-Managers
Agreement to which it was related, the second agreement
"create[d] the type of rights and responsibilities allocated in a
management contract."46 The court identified four provisions of
the agreement that indicated that it was collateral to a
management contract.147 Two of the provisions gave Machal the
right to approve, along with the Band, the construction, design,
and naming of any gaming-related facility, as well as the right to
evaluate and jointly approve the banking arrangements for the
revenue generated." In addition to transferring responsibility for
these management-related functions, the agreement mandated

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
to the
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The terms of this second Agreement "show[ed] that it [wa]s related
Co-Managers Agreement." Id.
Id. at 667-68.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 668.
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that the Tribe repay the construction loans from the net revenue
generated by the gaming operation.'
Even more importantly, it
gave Machal the right to receive a percentage of total net gaming
revenues."' The overall effect of these four provisions was to
"provide[] for the management of all or part of a gaming
operation.""' As such, the agreement was collateral to the CoManagers Agreement (a management contract) and, therefore,
void for lack of NIGC approval."'
(iii) The BBC Settlement Agreement: A Management
Contract Requiring NIGC Approval
The BBC Settlement Agreement between Machal, BBC and
the Band was also unenforceable for lack of NIGC approval." The
NIGC previously deemed the Settlement Agreement to be a
management contract, reasoning that it allocated management4
authority for the future gaming operation among the parties.,
The Machal court, after extensive discussion and analysis,
disagreed with the NIGC's analysis because the provisions that
the NIGC cited for support did not actually transfer managerial
authority. 5' Nonetheless, one provision of the BBC Settlement
Agreement convinced the Machal court that the Agreement was
indeed a management contract and, therefore, void without NIGC
approval. 6
The BBC Settlement Agreement was meant to settle the
parties' differences regarding their respective contractual rights in
connection with the Development Agreements."'
Among other
things, the BBC Settlement Agreement made BBC responsible for
coordinating and arranging construction financing and initial
operating capital for the Band's future gaming operation." 8
Machal was responsible for the land acquisition process and for
supplying the funding needed to conduct environmental or other
studies that are required prior to construction of a gaming
operation.'
Machal also agreed to negotiate with the other
parties in good faith, in order to create financing, development,
and management agreements related to the future gaming
operation.'
Further, both BBC and Machal were obligated to

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 667-68.
Id. at 668 (internal citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 669.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 668.
Id.
Id.; Tri-Millennium, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 678-79.
Machal, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 668.
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negotiate in good faith for the purpose of creating a Co-Managers
Agreement"' that would delineate their respective managerial

duties. 162
In exchange for these promises, the Band promised to repay
the promissory notes it had given BBC and Machal to secure
financial obligations created pursuant to the BBC Settlement
Agreement." The Band also promised to grant Machal and BBC
exclusive management-related rights with respect to the future
gaming operation, and to negotiate with them in good faith to
develop a management agreement naming BBC and Machal comanagers of its first gaming operation."
The Band specifically
agreed to allow certain terms to be included in that future
management contract, including provisions that allow the
contractors to be paid a percentage of gaming revenues.
The NIGC deemed these features tell-tale evidence that the
BBC Settlement Agreement was a management contract in
disguise.'6
The Machal court, disagreeing with the NIGC's
assessment, focused on the present effect of those provisions, not
on their future implications.'67 The NIGC accorded great weight to
the provisions that referred to BBC and Machal as co-managers of
a future gaming operation and specified the manner in which
managerial authority would be allocated between the two entities
in a future management contract. 61
The court, however,
emphasized that, "[r]ead in context ... [neither] provision actually
transfers any management authority to Machal or BBC." 9
Instead, the agreement obligated the parties only to negotiate in
good faith, and dictated the substance of those negotiations.
Likewise, the NIGC supported its finding by pointing to the
portion of the BBC Settlement Agreement obligating Machal and
BBC to enter a Co-Managers Agreement containing certain
management-related provisions. 7 ° Regarding this provision, the
161. See supra notes 138-46 and accompanying text. The Co-Managers
Agreement was, of course, held by the Machal court to be a management
contract requiring NIGC approval. Machal, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 668.
162. Machal, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 668; Tri-Millennium, 387 F. Supp. 2d at
679.
163. Machal, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 668.
164. Id. at 668-69; Tri-Millennium, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 679.
165. Machal, 387 F. Supp. 2d. at 669. Notwithstanding the clever
craftsmanship of this provision in arranging for the future payout of gaming
revenues but not actively and presently securing that payout, the NIGC had
cited this contract feature as further evidence that the Settlement Agreement
was a collateral agreement to a management contract. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. Pursuant to this section of the Settlement Agreement, the CoManagers Agreement would allocate managerial authority in a certain
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Machal court focused on the BBC Settlement Agreement's present
effect. The court reiterated that the provision did not actually
transfer authority.7 ' It did not have the effect of granting BBC or
Machal "the right to manage any aspect of an anticipated gaming
operation.' 72 Instead, the BBC Settlement Agreement obligated
the Band only to "include certain provisions in a future
management contract yet to be negotiated." 73 Because it did not
effectively transfer management authority over a gaming
operation, the second provision of the BBC Settlement Agreement
was not considered to "provide for the management of a gaming
operation" in
the manner characteristic of management
74
agreements.
A third provision, however, convinced the Machal court that
the BBC Settlement Agreement was indeed a management
contract. The provision granted Machal and BBC exclusive rights
to enter a management contract with the Band, as well as "gaming
on the first Gaming Operation." 7 ' The court found it significant
that this provision excluded not only other non-tribal contractors
from the first gaming operation, but also the Band itself.7 6 Unlike
the other two provisions cited by the NIGC, this "alienation by the
Jena Band of its right to manage gaming operations located on
tribal lands in Louisiana" was a present transfer of management
rights.'77 Based on the present effect of the transfer, the Machal
court concluded that the BBC Settlement Agreement was a
management contract and void for lack of NIGC approval. 8
(iv) The Tri-Millennium Settlement Agreement: A
Management Contract Requiring NIGC Approval
The second settlement agreement, between the Band and TriMillennium only, provided for, among other things, release by the
contractor of its claims against the Band in exchange for the
payment of $1,350,000.'
The remainder of the Tri-Millennium
Settlement Agreement provided for stock sales and potential
additional payments, all conditioned on NIGC approval of the
Band's gaming operation and its related management,
development, and financing contracts. 8 °

manner between BBC and Machal. Id.
171. Tri-Millennium, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 679.
172. Machal, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 669.
173. Id.
174. Id.; NIGC Bulletin 94-5, supra note 10.
175. Machal, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 669; Tri-Millennium, 387 F. Supp. 2d at

680.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Tri-Millennium, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 680.

180. Id.
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The district court was puzzled by the NIGC's position that the
Tri-Millennium Settlement Agreement was collateral to a
management contract and thus void for lack of NICG approval."'
Still, the court did not hesitate to affirm that position, albeit based
upon different reasoning.
The Tri-Millennium Settlement
Agreement contained "the same fatal flaw" as the BBC Settlement
Agreement." 2 For whatever reason, the drafters of the TriMillennium Settlement Agreement found it necessary to include
the exclusivity provision of the BBC Settlement Agreement,
whereby Machal and BBC were granted the right to operate the
first gaming facility as well as the exclusive right to enter into a
management contract with the Band."
That single provision
rendered the otherwise benign Tri-Millennium Settlement
Agreement void as an unapproved collateral agreement providing
for the management of a gaming operation."
c.

Pointers for Practitioners: A Helpful Checklist

Beyond their extensive analysis of the four agreements, the
Jena Band cases provide practitioners another useful tool by
illuminating the issue of when an agreement should be submitted
for NIGC approval. The reasoning in the cases closely tracked the
reasoning used by the Tenth Circuit in Kickapoo. The Jena Band
cases also offer a checklist of terms that are considered
management-related. The presence of any of these terms in an
agreement should alert practitioners that the agreement requires
NIGC approval, or at least, a declination letter, to ensure its
enforceability in the face of a challenge.
Taken together, the terms on the checklist "give content to
the concept of management" in that they all "indicate a transfer of
management authority" from an Indian tribe to a party other than
the tribe.18
As such, the district court's list should help
practitioners identify the types of authority transfers that indicate
a document is a management agreement, or collateral to a
management agreement:
1. Transferring responsibility for the performance of the daily
operations and maintenance of a gaming operation.
2. Transferring

responsibility

for

the

establishment

and

181. Id. To the court, it appeared as though the NIGC's opinion was not
based on any specific terms of the Tri-Millennium Agreement, but solely on
the fact that it was collateral to the management contract. Id.
182. Id.
183. Tri-Millennium, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 680.

184. Id.
185. Machal, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 665; Tri-Millennium, 387 F. Supp. 2d at
676. The district court's checklist is drawn from Kickapoo, NIGC Bulletin 945, 25 U.S.C. § 2711, and 25 C.F.R. § 531.1.
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maintenance of accounting procedures for the gaming operation.
3. Transferring responsibility for financing procedures such as
financial reporting and the paying of taxes, employees and other
costs.

4. Setting term limits for transfers of powers or conferrals of rights.
5. Quantifying the payments or compensation to which the parties
are entitled.
6. Delineating the sources from which payments are to be made...
[or] specifying whether payments are to be based on a percentage of
net revenues realized by a gaming operation.
7. Transferring responsibility for and control over the construction
of a gaming operation. 18
Agreements with terms that could be construed as
accomplishing any of the above transfers of responsibility should
be flagged as potential collateral agreements that require NIGC
approval. Practitioners should then consult with their clients to
determine whether the agreement can be rewritten in a way that
does not run afoul of the IGRA approval requirement.
If
redrafting such an agreement is not possible, the agreement, no
matter how remotely connected it is to the primary development
project, should nevertheless be submitted to the NIGC for
approval or declination.
Moreover, in the aftermath of Kickapoo, whenever the terms
contained in a contract relate to any type of management activity,
that agreement should be submitted to the NIGC for approval or
declination. Kickapoo emphasizes that transfers of management
responsibility may be partial rather than comprehensive.'87
Accordingly, any allocation of a management-type function may
render the contract collateral and subject to NIGC approval,
regardless of whether the obligation is accompanied by
management-type rights, or whether a management function is
performed as a matter of right granted in that contract. As
Kickapoo, Kean-Argovitz, and the Jena Band cases illustrate,
regardless of how carefully one structures the transaction, an
enforceability challenge can result in unwelcome surprises.
Depending on how the presiding court reads the Kickapoo line of
cases, contracts thought to be enforceable without NIGC approval
might, in a post-Kickapoo world, nonetheless be deemed collateral
to the management agreement (and therefore unenforceable)

186. Machal, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 665; Tri-Millennium, 387 F. Supp. 2d at
676-77.
187. Kickapoo, 412 F.3d at 1175.
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based on a single provision, as were the settlement agreements in
the Jena Band cases.
C. Agreements Not Collateralto a ManagementAgreement
1. BounceBack Technologies.com, Inc. v. Harrah's
Entertainment, Inc. (Bounceback)"
In this unreported case, a consulting agreement was neither a
management contract nor an agreement collateral to a
management contract, therefore, it did not require NIGC
Like Kickapoo, Kean-Argovitz, and the Jena Band
approval."
cases, BounceBack arose from an Indian tribe's efforts to develop
casino gaming on tribal lands. To this end, the Pokagon Band of
Potawatomi Indians (the "Pokagon") executed a Memorandum of
Understanding with Harrah's Entertainment, followed by a
Management Agreement and a Development Agreement between
the Pokagon and various Harrah's subsidiaries. 9 ° In addition to
assigning rights and responsibilities related to the development,
construction, and oversight of the gaming facility, the
Development Agreement contained a non-compete provision that
applied to all the parties. 9 '
Nearly a year after the primary management and
development agreements were executed, one of the non-tribal
contractor's subsidiaries, Harrah's Southwest, entered a Technical
Assistance and Consulting Agreement ("Consulting Agreement")
The third party later changed its name to
with a third party.9
Harrah's Southwest was also a party to the
BounceBack. 9 '
Development Agreement that contained the non-compete
The consulting agreement incorporated the
provision.'
Development Agreement's non-compete provision by reference. 9
The execution of the Consulting Agreement marked the
termination of the original Memorandum of Understanding
96
between the Pokagon and Harrah's Entertainment. 1
More than a year after the Memorandum of Understanding
was terminated pursuant to the parties' agreement, the Pokagon
188. No. Civ. 98-2058 (JNEJGL), 2003 WL 21432579, at *1 (D. Minn. June
13, 2003).
189. Id. at *4 (internal citation omitted).
190. Bounceback, 2003 WL 21432579, at *1.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at *1 n.3.
194. Id. at *1.
195. Id. Harrah's Southwest was a party to the Development Agreement as
well as to the consulting agreement with BounceBack. Id. BounceBack,
however, was not a party to any agreements other than the consulting
agreement with Harrah's Southwest that was at issue in the case. Id.
196. Id.
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and the remaining Harrah's subsidiaries terminated the
Management and Development Agreements, also by mutual
agreement. 9 ' BounceBack then sued all of the Harrah's entities
claiming, inter alia, breach of contract based on its consulting
agreement with Harrah's Southwest.'98 In response, the Harrah's
defendants moved for partial summary judgment, alleging that
BounceBack breached its non-compete obligation. "
a. The Consulting Agreement: Not Collateral
to a Management Contract
Whether BounceBack's motion for summary judgment on its
breach of contract claim would succeed depended on whether the
unapproved Consulting Agreement with Harrah's Southwest was
enforceable," or was an unapproved collateral agreement. 20 1 The
BounceBack court considered the applicable federal regulations
defining a "management contract."2 2°
Ultimately, the court
determined that the Consulting Agreement did "not fall within
this definition." °3 In reaching this determination, the District
Court for the District of Minnesota employed a line of reasoning
similar to that used in other circuits by the Kickapoo and KeanArgovitz courts, and in the two Jena Band cases. As such, the
court focused on the structure of the transaction as a whole and
the functional role of the consulting agreement within the overall
structure. °
In the BounceBack project, the agreement that allocated all of
the rights and responsibilities for the management of the proposed
gaming operation was the Management Agreement between
Harrah's Southwest and the Pokagon.2 "5
The Managemenet
Agreement effectively transferred the Pokagon's entire managerial
responsibility to Harrah's Southwest. The Management Agreement also contained an exclusivity provision that granted
Harrah's Southwest the sole managerial rights regarding the
whole gaming operation. "°
In exchange, Harrah's Southwest
promised to oversee and direct the casino's day-to-day operations,
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at *6.
200. Id. at *3. The parties did not dispute that the consulting agreement
had not received NIGC approval. Id.
201. Id. at *6.
202. Id. at *4; see, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 502.15 (defining a "management contract"
as "any contract, subcontract, or collateral agreement between an Indian tribe
and a contractor or between a contractor and a subcontractor if such contract
provides for the management of all or part of a gaming operation.").
203. BounceBack, 2003 WL 21432579, at *4.
204. Id. at *7.
205. Id.
206. Id. at *4.
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and to assume responsibility for all of the affairs relating to the
management, maintenance, and operation of the casino. 207
By contrast, the consulting agreement between BounceBack
and Harrah's Southwest did not provide BounceBack with any
managerial authority."'8 It did not alter in any way the allocation
of management authority outlined in the Management
Agreement." All management functions for the proposed casino
were covered in the other agreements. 10 The other agreements
gave managerial authority to entities other than BounceBack, and
BounceBack was not a party to any of the agreements.2 1 1 No term
in the consulting agreement altered any of the managementrelated provisions in the other agreements; in fact, one section of
the consulting agreement expressly disclaimed any intent to do so.
The provision stated that BounceBack was to have "no right to
affect the management decisions made by Harrah's Southwest in
its performance of the Management Agreement." 11 Because the
Consulting Agreement did not transfer any management-related
authority or managerial rights, the court deemed the agreement
valid and enforceable, despite its lack of NIGC approval. 1'
b. The Development Agreement: Not a Management Contract
Requiring NIGC Approval
Like BounceBack's motion for summary judgment, the
Harrah's defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on its
breach of covenant not to compete claim depended on the
enforceability of an unapproved gaming-related contract. 4 The
Development Agreement contained the original non-compete
provision.25
Although BounceBack was not a party to the
Development Agreement, BounceBack's Consulting Agreement
expressly incorporated by reference the non-compete provision."'
Like the BounceBack consulting agreement, the NIGC did not
approve the Development Agreement. 7 The Harrah's defendants

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. (internal citations omitted) (interal punctuation omitted).
Practitioners should note, however, that this term likely would not have saved
the consulting agreement from being declared unenforceable as an unapproved
collateral agreement if the effect of the agreement as a whole was to grant any
managerial authority to BounceBack.
213. See id. at *4 ("[Tlhe TACA [consulting agreement] is not a 'management

contract' requiring NIGC approval... [and is] legally enforceable .....
214. Id. at *6.
215. Id. at *1-6.
216. Id. at *6.
217. Id.
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argued that the Development Agreement was unenforceable given
the Eighth Circuit's decision in Casino Magic."8 The BounceBack
court disagreed, however, and drew several distinctions between
the two cases.
Casino Magic involved three interrelated
agreements.
An initial agreement engaged the non-tribal
contractor only as a consultant, 219 but was followed by two
agreements
that
conferred
managerial
rights
and
responsibilities. 220
By contrast, all managerial aspects of the
BounceBack development project were addressed in a single
agreement, the Management Agreement between the Pokagon and
the Harrah's entities. 22' Neither the Development Agreement, nor
any of the other agreements related to the Pokagon's casino
development project, altered the allocation of managerial
authority
in the
monolithic
Management
Agreement.2
Accordingly, the Development Agreement did not "provide E for the
management of all or part of a gaming operation,"2 2 therefore, it
was "not part of a 'management
contract' that required NIGC
24
approval under the IGRA."'
c. Pointers for Practitioners: An Aspirational Model for
Structuring Gaming-Facility Development Transactions
Notwithstanding the Tenth Circuit's dismissal of BounceBack
because it contained "no relevant analysis" on the issue of which
gaming-related contracts require NIGC approval,2 2 ' BounceBack
may offer practitioners an aspirational model for structuring
gaming facility development transactions.
Ideally, all
management-related activities and transfers of a tribe's
responsibility to a non-tribal contractor should be cohesively
contained in a single management agreement or series of
management contracts.
To be enforceable, these agreements
would clearly require NIGC approval. The decision as to whether
other transaction documents also require NIGC approval depends
upon whether those agreements alter any rights or responsibilities
allocated in the central management contracts. In this regard,
practitioners may find it useful to consult the checklist of
management-type transfers of authority compiled by the district
court in the Jena Band cases.2 '
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at **6-7.
Id. at *7; Casino Magic, 293 F.3d at 421.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.

222.
223.
224.
225.

Id.
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Id. at *7.
Kickapoo, 412 F.3d at 1175.

226. See supra notes 113-87 and accompanying text (discussing Machal v.
Jena Band of Choctaw Indians,387 F. Supp. 2d 659 (W.D. La. 2005) and Jena
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Tri-Millennium Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 671 (W.D.
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Practitioners should be aware, however, of a potential flaw in
this aspiration-filled approach. BounceBack was decided before
the Tenth Circuit's extensive discussion of the management
contract enforceability issue in Kickapoo. In Kickapoo, the Tenth
Circuit construed the C.F.R. definition of "management contracts"
as "partial rather than absolute."" ' Kickapoo rejected the notion
that "only when [management] functions are performed as a
matter of right" is a contract a management contract requiring
approval. Accordingly, practitioners seeking to structure a gaming
development project in the elegant, streamlined tradition of
BounceBack should be aware that any agreement, no matter how
minor, that contains arguably management-related terminology
(regardless of whether the agreement transfers full rights or
responsibilities) at the very least should be submitted to the NIGC
for declination.
2. United States of America ex rel. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v.
'
President R.C.- St. Regis Mgmt. Co. 28
The events leading up to this qui tam action2 9 began with a
series of attempts by the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe ("St. Regis") to
form business alliances that would allow it to develop a casino on
tribal lands.2 ' Eventually, the defendant management company
in this case ("President") agreed to finance and construct the
Akwesasne Mohawk Casino. 3 ' President also agreed to manage
the casino for the first five years of its operation."2 In exchange,
St. Regis promised to pay President a management fee, and to
repay up to twenty million dollars of the development expenses

La. 2005)).
227. Kickapoo, 412 F.3d at 1175.
228. No. 7:02-CV-845, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 12456, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. June 13,

2005).
229. Id. The case was originally brought as a qui tam action pursuant to 25
U.S.C. § 81 (2000). Id. This statute requires that any contract between an

Indian tribe and a non-Indian party pertaining to Indian lands must be
approved by the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs. Any contract violating these requirements can be challenged as void
and unenforceable in a qui tam action for declaratory judgment. When the
IGRA was passed in 1988, the authority for overseeing all Indian gaming
activity was conferred upon the NIGC. Even though the qui tam provision of
§ 81 was repealed before the St. Regis decision was issued, a finding was made
in this case that the repeal was not retroactive. Id. at *7. The qui tam
provisions governed because they were in effect at the time the contract was
executed. Nonetheless, the District Court for the Northern District of New

York based its analysis on the familiar IGRA framework used in other
management-contract cases, particularly 25 U.S.C. § 2711 and 25 C.F.R.

§ 502.15. Id. at*9.
230. Id. at *4-5.
231. Id. at *5.
232. Id.
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incurred by President. 3 The expenses were to be repaid from the
revenue generated by the casino."" St. Regis and President
memorialized their promises in a Management Agreement that
was subsequently approved by the NIGC. 32
Under the Management Agreement, President had the
authority to contract with other non-tribal entities for the
construction of the casino."' One such non-tribal contractor was
Anderson-Blake, with whom President entered a Construction
Contract.237 The enforceability of the Contract, which was not
submitted for NIGC approval, was at issue in the qui tam action. 38
Eight days after the casino opened, St. Regis fired President
and took over the management of the casino. 39 President sued to
recover under the Management Agreement.24 ° St. Regis countered
by asking the NIGC to modify or void the Management Agreement
altogether. 42 The NIGC never responded to this request, leaving
President and subthe Management Agreement unaltered. 42
contractor Anderson-Blake then submitted the Construction
Contract to the NIGC for approval. '
The NIGC issued a
declination letter opining that the Construction Contract was
enforceable without NIGC approval.2 " The NIGC reasoned that no
portion of the Construction Contract provided for management of
the casino gaming operation for purposes of the IGRA.4 5
a.

The Construction Contract: No NIGC Approval Required

The St. Regis court faced cross-motions for summary
judgment.24' At the heart of each party's motion lay the
enforceability of the unapproved Construction Contract. 7 While
St. Regis argued that the Construction Contract was a collateral
agreement and, therefore, void for lack of approval, the non-tribal
contractors insisted, based on the NIGC's opinion letter, that the
Construction Contract was enforceable absent approval.2"

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

*1.
*6.
*6-7.
*7.
*1.
*9.
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The court's analysis of the Construction Contract led to
approval of both the NIGC's opinion and the position of the nontribal contractors. 49 Several features of the Construction Contract
indicated that the Contract was not collateral to a management
agreement for purposes of the IGRA. 5 ° It contained no terms
relating to the "operation of games, receipt of revenue, issuance of
prizes, or payment of expenses." 51 The Contract's "only possible
connection to a gaming operation" was its use of the term "casino
facility" to describe the building to be constructed. 52
Further, the Contract was drafted according to the standard
form endorsed by the contractor's professional organization."
It
required that the sub-contractor only construct the physical
structure for the gaming facility, and provide all labor, materials,
equipment, and supervision related to that construction. 54 All of
the parties' rights and obligations under the Construction
Contract were finite and had a definite term.5
Most importantly, the payment-related terms in the
Construction Contract proved it was not structured as a
management or collateral agreement. The Contract provided that
the sub-contractor would receive payment according to a specific
schedule. 2 None of the payments were connected to any gaming
facility revenues."' The Construction Contract also specified the
total amount to be paid to the contractor."5 This amount was to be
paid in a definitive number of payments, with a final payment due
upon completion of the construction.2 9 In addition, the payments
related to the construction of the casino only. 260 No term of the
contract gave the construction company any stake in the gaming
operation. 61
b.

Pointers for Practitioners

Even though St. Regis was decided days before Kickapoo and,
therefore, lies outside that line of cases, it helpfully illustrates the
249. Id. at*10-11.
250. Id. at *10.
251. Id.; see also 25 C.F.R. § 502.15 (defining "gaming operation" as an entity
that "operates the games, receives the revenues, issues the prizes, and pays
the expenses").
252. St. Regis, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 12456, at *9-10.
253. Id. at *10. The Contract used the standard form approved by the
Associated General Contractors of America. Id.
254. Id.

255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. The total payable by the President (the casino management entity)
to the sub-contractor construction company was $14,180,564.00. Id.

259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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types of provisions and overall structures that differentiate
agreements requiring NIGC approval from those that do not.
Striking contrasts distinguish the Kean-Argovitz Development
Agreement, which was deemed collateral to a management
agreement and required NIGC approval, from the St. Regis
Construction Contract, which required no approval. The most
crucial differences relate to the payment terms of the respective
agreements. The structure of the payment terms reveals much
regarding whether each contract created an ongoing managementtype of relationship between the tribe and the non-tribal
contractor, or whether any relationship was limited to a definite
term.
The St. Regis Construction Contract specified the total
payment due to the sub-contractor in exchange for the
performance of the sub-contractor's obligations. 6 ' Pursuant to the
Construction Contract, the sub-contractor's association with St.
Regis was limited to a one-time performance of a specific task for a
pre-defined price.2" Once final payment was made and the casino
construction was complete, the construction company would have
no further claim to any revenues generated by the casino's
operations."' All of the other rights and obligations created by the
Construction Contract were also finite and terminated upon
completion of the construction and the sub-contractor's receipt of
the final payment.26 By contrast, the Kean-Argovitz Development
Agreement gave the contractor a future stake in the gaming
operations, through the provision of payments derived from
gaming revenues. 26
The payment terms of the Development
Agreement thus suggested an ongoing relationship with no
definite term.267 The nature of the relationship as an ongoing,
management-type relationship is further confirmed by the
exclusivity provision of the Development Agreement.
Further, while the St. Regis Construction Contract obligated
the contractor to provide the materials and labor, and incur
additional costs associated with its obligations, the costs were not

262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Kean-Argovitz, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 906.
267. Id. NIGC Bulletin 94-5 suggests that this type of ongoing relationship
is one possible indication that a contract creates a management-type
relationship between a tribe and a non-tribal contractor. NIGC Bulletin 94-5,
supra note 12.
268. St. Regis, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 12456, at *10. The exclusivity
provision was also linked to the loan commitment, which was expressly
identified in the Agreement as consideration for the Tribe's grant of exclusive
development rights to the contractor. Id.
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characterized as loans to St. Regis.269 Nor was the fee paid to the
contractor in exchange for its performance characterized as a loan
repayment. 270
By contrast, the Kean-Argovitz Development
Agreement characterized the developer's funding obligations as
loans to the Band, payable "solely" from gaming revenues. 27 ' The
NIGC considered this type of arrangement to be highly indicative
of a Management Agreement that requires approval.2 2
Finally, the St. Regis Construction Contract contained
nothing even remotely similar to the exclusivity provision of the
Kean-Argovitz Development Agreement.
In the Kean-Argovitz
Development Agreement, the developer's loan commitment was
expressly identified as consideration for the Band's grant of
exclusive development rights. 73
The exclusivity provision
encompassed not only development-related rights, but also the
right to manage the casino under the Management Agreement.274
Moreover, the language of the Kean-Argovitz Development
Agreement linked the term of the exclusivity provision to the
actual Management Agreement. 7 1 The Kean-Argovitz developer's
complex relationship with the Band thus contrasts sharply with
the simple, finite, short-term relationship created by the St. Regis
Construction Contract.276 Based on the vast differences in the
effects of the two agreements, practitioners seeking to draft nonmanagement agreements, which are not deemed collateral
agreements requiring approval, should strive to pattern subcontractor relationships with tribes after the finite, short-term
relationship created by the St. Regis Construction Contract. Any
contract creating a complex Kean-Argovitz-style relationship
between a contractor and a tribe will almost certainly be deemed
sufficiently management-related to require NIGC approval.
V.

CONCLUSION

In the aftermath of Kickapoo, practitioners that seek to avoid
running afoul of the NIGC approval requirements should carefully
consider the overall structure of the gaming-facility project before
drafting any agreement, no matter how minor. If any term of the
contract relates to some type of management activity, as identified
by the Kickapoo court and the Jena Band cases, the agreement
should be submitted to the NIGC for approval or declination.
Practitioners should pay particular attention to payment
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id.
Id.
Kean-Argovitz, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 906.
Id.; NIGC Bulletin 94-5, supra note 12.
Kean-Argovitz, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 906-07.
Id. at 906.
Id.
St. Regis, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 12456, at *10.
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provisions in gaming-related contracts, as such provisions reveal
the type of relationship created by the agreement - whether finite
or ongoing and potentially management-related.
Regardless of how carefully structured a transaction is, or
how closely it adheres to the BounceBack aspirational model (with
all management-related terms confined to certain instruments
that are undeniably management agreements requiring NIGC
approval), practitioners must not forget that an agreement may be
deemed unenforceable for lack of NIGC approval on the basis of a
single management-related term that transfers only a minor
aspect of managerial responsibility. As Kickapoo cautions, such a
transfer may be partial and may not necessarily be accompanied
by a concomitant grant of management-related rights.
While checklists of potential management-related terms may
be useful in flagging problematic management terms lurking in an
otherwise benign document, any uncertainty as to a contract's
future enforceability in the face of a challenge should be addressed
by submitting the agreement to the NIGC for a declination letter,
or even, as circumstances dictate, to undergo the full approval
process. Had the law firm that drafted the Pledge Agreement in
the recent bungled casino financing transaction taken this
approach, instead of projecting unfounded confidence in the Pledge
Agreement's enforceability, the client would have been spared the
expense of being unable to collect on the defaulted Pledge
Agreement. Furthermore, the law firm itself would have been
spared the humiliation of malpractice sanctions. Accordingly, in
the post-Kickapoo world, practitioners are well-advised to make
every effort possible to convince impatient casino developers and
other gaming contractors of the high price of avoiding the NIGC
approval or declination process.

